I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In 1991 India imported just 17.8% of its commercial energy-today it imports more than 30% and the share of imports is steadily growing.
1 Demand for oil has doubled to 2.9 million barrels per day (mbd) in just a decade, 2 and is projected to reach around 7 mbd by 2030, growing annually at about 4%. 3 Coal imports are expected to surge more than 200% in the next decade, and natural gas imports will also rise dramatically. 4 India's continued economic success hinges on obtaining reliable and cost-effective energy supplies; increasingly, those supplies depend on national and foreign delivery chains that are creaking and feared unreliable.
There is a growing recognition that energy security needs to be a critical component of India's foreign policy and energy policy. 5 Energy security has been defined by India's political leadership as being able to "supply lifeline energy to all our citizens as well as meet their effective demand for safe and convenient energy . . .at affordable cost." 6 This same theme⎯the Indian energy vision⎯has found voice time and again among India's senior political leadership. 7 Yet, the across-the-board recognition of the need for reforms and the steps taken towards fulfilling them have not translated into sufficient real progress⎯while reforms in the coal sector may have begun to meaningfully take hold in the past couple of years, they are also very much incomplete. Dismantling of price controls on some oil products, the keystone of efforts to make the oil markets more responsive to world conditions (and thus more reliable), has been politically hobbled as the Government of India (GoI) has failed to embrace the politically toxic task of passing the true cost of petroleum products on to customers. 8 A scheme to open the nation's oil and gas fields to international capital and technology, with the aim of boosting national hydrocarbon output and cutting dependence on foreign sources, has failed to engage any major international oil and gas company in a meaningful way so far.
This paper explains the ever-increasing gap between India's energy vision and its energy reality, with a special focus on the implications for India's foreign policy. Like several other countries, most notably China, India has used its foreign policy muscle to attempt to secure particular energy sources; however, it has, for the most part, only been successful if foreign target is weak and particularly beholden to India.
We argue that the general failure of India's energy strategy with respect to foreign policy hinges on three factors. First, and most importantly Indian policies hinge on political support that is fickle because the government is based on political coalitions that are constantly shifting and rooted in the marriage of uncommon bedfellows. In particular, India's federalist system ensures that national policies are highly affected by state-level politics-often by parties and political forces that have little concern for India's "national interest". This fundamental structural tension is heightened by the fact that one key element of energy policy, the power sector, is largely under state control, whereas most other areas of energy policy are controlled at the national level. Second, the government's administrative capacity in most areas of the energy system is extremely weak; in this vacuum, the government de facto relies heavily on lethargic state-owned enterprises that already dominate the sector to provide crucial administrative functions. This ensures that most policy reforms-which usually aim at reducing the influence of state enterprises and opening space for private players-are muted in their practical influence. Third, all this means that it is hard for the foreign policy apparatus to make credible commitments about India's behavior in overseas projects; moreover, when working abroad, the parts of the energy system that are easiest for the foreign policy system to mobilize are those where India has the least to offer in technology and capital. Those parts include, notably, the overseas arm of the state oil company (ONGC's "Videsh" Division, known as OVL)-a firm that has performed miserably in most efforts to secure overseas oil supplies.
We make these three arguments by looking across the entire Indian energy system. That is a daunting task, and to make it easier we focus on a few crucial sectors and revealing vignettes in each.
As we will discuss in more detail later, much of the current energy woes of India ensue from a tightly regulated energy sector organized through state-run companies. These companies are the main agents of the GoI. For instance, the coal sector is dominated by the extremely inefficient state-run behemoth Coal India Limited (CIL), which controls 85% of India's coal mining market. CIL employs 50 times the manpower of private sector leader Peabody Coal while producing only one-third more coal. In the oil and gas sector, state-owned oil companies produce 87% of India's domestic oil. 9 But while India's net oil import bill stood at nearly $40 billion in 2006-07, the domestic crude oil production⎯and especially that of state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC)⎯has been flagging at best, reflecting both India's increasingly depleted reserves and ONGC's poor exploration and production (E&P) strategy. Historically, the GoI has entrusted these agents with the job of implementing the national plans that are developed by the planning commission. The GoI has only slowly built its own independent capacity to identify opportunities in the energy system and to regulate behavior.
Increasingly, frustrated by the poor performance of India's domestic energy sector, India's diplomatic corps has also become actively involved in helping India achieve energy sufficiency. In 2007, the foreign ministry announced the formation of an energy security unit in an effort to make better deals abroad for resource acquisition in the oil, gas, and coal markets, markets where India has frequently played second fiddle to a more aggressive China.
India neither has China's financial power nor political muscle to advance its case. While
China has been able to bundle attractive development packages along with sweet financial deals to acquire energy resources outside China, India has made only limited moves on this front, a consequence of its limited financial and political leverage. The only international energy projects that come online are when the party on the other side of the equation⎯for its special geographical location or heavy political dependence on India or some other special reasons⎯has extraordinary interests in the deal. A prominent example is recent hydropower investment in Bhutan-a much smaller country that is geographically dependent on India. In situations that lack such dependencies, India has not been able to coordinate the necessary efforts to benefit its energy situation. India's tense, often hostile, relations with crucial neighbors, especially Pakistan and Bangladesh, do not help the situation either. India itself is in the midst of repositioning itself in global politics from a traditionally non-aligned country to a nation more integrated with the western economies. This state of political confusion further constrains India's international energy strategy.
As the reality of limitations of India's ability to reform its state-owned companies directly and quickly and to forge successful international projects have dawned, an indirect process of reform-reform by stealth-has moved forward, apace with broader market-oriented reforms in India. Although this approach has many parts, the most important one has been to increase private participation in energy-related investments all along the value chain.
Increasingly, large private-sector companies-especially those with strong political leverage, for example Reliance, Tata, Essar-are playing a greater role in defining the domestic energy agenda; but these companies are also proving critical in putting together components, financial and political, necessary for successful international projects.
II. SECTORS AND VIGNETTES
The Indian energy system is huge and complex; its interactions with the foreign policy apparatus, too, are complex. To help focus on the forces that matter most, in this section we provide brief overviews of the three most important sectors of the energy system: oil & gas; coal; and electricity. In each sector we offer a vignette or two of important policy decisions that reveal the predominant politico-economic factors at play. Along the way, we elaborate the three main arguments introduced at the outset of this essay.
II.1 OIL AND GAS
India imported over 75% of its crude oil requirements in 2006-07, compared with about 50% in 1997-98. This rapid increase in import dependency has occurred⎯and is likely to continue increasing⎯because India's oil demand has grown dramatically and, despite significant new domestic exploration efforts, domestic production has remained flat around 33 million metric tonne per annum (MMTPA).
India's increasing import dependency has affected India's foreign policy in several ways.
First, and fundamentally, India's geography makes it particularly dependent on the most proximate source of imports-about three quarters of the country's imported oil comes from The Middle East, leaving India as one of the world's most dependent on that region of the world. While oil security is a function of the whole world oil market's operation, for supply of oil (and other hydrocarbons) was essential to India's planned economic growth of 8-10% over the next three decades. The plan envisioned a two-prong strategy. One track 11 (i) Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell (PPAC), Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, India (ii) Due to earnings from exported petroleum products-notably naphtha, petrol, and diesel-the net oil import bill was about $40 billion in 2006-07. Close to the Persian Gulf sources of crude, India is well-positioned to become a refining hub; some of its refinery infrastructure is already oriented entirely for re-export.
would accelerate efforts to find and produce oil at home. The other would empower Indian companies to find equity oil abroad.
This two-pronged strategy involved many complex elements. Our analysis focuses on the two most important: the New Exploration and Licensing Policy (NELP), which was the keystone of efforts to spur domestic exploration and production (E&P); and the operations of ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL), the GoI's main agent in its quest for equity oil and gas reserves abroad.
Vignette: The New Exploration and Licensing Policy (NELP)
In the pre-NELP era, India had provisions that allowed private companies to search for oil.
But the bidding provisions were opaque and covered only small areas. ONGC along with some other state-owned oil companies played a large role both in delineating the blocks to be offered and in the group that monitored the bidding process. In some cases it was found that these state-owned companies deliberately put on offer blocks that they had unsuccessfully explored before. In addition, finalizing the production sharing contracts (PSCs) was a long and cumbersome process, as it needed approval from several ministries.
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These roadblocks reduced the attractiveness of the pre-NELP blocks. The results, not surprisingly, were not impressive.
In 1998 India instituted the NELP, which was intended to ensure that exploration blocks offered by the government were offered to companies in a competitive way. The intention was to encourage more players to enter the field and thus elicit more advanced technology and larger commitments of capital for E&P. NELP allows 100% foreign direct investment (FDI) and offers improved contractual terms that make business in the oil sector attractive in India. Before the first NELP round in 1999, only 11% of the Indian sedimentary basin was under exploration. This number has gone up to over 40% through the 162 blocks that have been offered via six bidding rounds (NELP-I to VI). 13 Participating companies have committed to invest over $8 billion in these blocks. 14 During NELP-VII, which closed in June 2008, the ministry of petroleum and natural gas (MoPNG) offered another 57 oil and gas blocks. But only 45 blocks received bids. Overall, the actual investment from NELP-VII auctions will be about $1.5 billion, in contrast with the initial hope for $3.5 billion.
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Although the private foreign bids for Indian oil and gas blocks have increased significantly through the NELP, the success in attracting foreign capital and technology has been slower than originally anticipated. The relatively lackluster performance of NELP is both due to design flaws in the NELP bidding process and due to the perception among international oil companies (IOCs) that India's geology is a poor prospect.
The initial design of NELP is partly to blame for poor elicitation of foreign technology. In the Bid Evaluation Criteria (BEC), heavy emphasis was given to the proposed work program for the blocks. 16 While this was probably motivated by the GoI's desire to provide strong incentives for rapid investment in E&P, it seems to have backfired. Some domestic companies, like ONGC, that had the advantage of having worked extensively in the domestic business environment (and geology), were especially aware of the lack of adequate performance-tracking and enforcement mechanisms for the work program. This led these companies to submit very aggressive work programs, knowing they would not be held accountable once they won the bid and also knowing that the bid evaluators would not be able to detect whether a bid was unduly optimistic. As a result, ONGC has won over half of all the NELP blocks offered so far. Given ONGC's poor E&P track record in the last two has not helped to dissuade these initial impressions. Indeed, the dearth of essential data has both hindered proper block evaluations by potential investors while also fueling suspicions that GoI is only offering unattractive acreage. 19 However, GoI has found it difficult to learn which rules would be most competitive because it is beholden to the state-owned oil companies that have controlled the sector for many years-in particular, ONGC. While the GoI has its own independent regulatory body (DGH), in practice the functioning of that body has faced several roadblocks during the NELP I through V. Even obtaining data from state-owned oil companies has been difficult. 20 The state-owned oil companies have relied on the weakness of GoI's capacity to frustrate the government's main reform initiative in this area.
In an effort to put NELP back on track, the DGH reformulated the selection criteria for NELP-VII, the latest round of NELP that closed in June 2008, to make the process more effective. 21 Many of the improvements inducted in NELP-VII were suggested in a study by the consultancy PetroFed that was commissioned by the MoPNG in 2005 to heed to the suggestions of international companies and to incorporate international best practices in NELP. 22 Further, all data were made available online for the blocks in NELP-VII. These changes and the positive impact of the recent oil and gas discoveries made under NELP may increase participation by overseas companies, probably in the form of joint ventures with domestic companies. But, the effective rigging of the policy so far by state-owned companies may well have set back the reform process by several years. Foreign companies, after observing years of NELP bidding that were not truly competitive, had to be cajoled into participating in NELP-VII. Vignette: Equity oil and gas abroad
Besides efforts to accelerate domestic E&P through NELP to solve the potential oil supply problem in India, another idea has gathered significant traction within the GoI: obtaining equity oil abroad. Broadly, the GoI believes that oil production owned by Indian companies, whether at home or abroad, enhances energy security by securing supply. 23 This argument is deeply flawed for a fungible commodity such as oil, but observing how the vision has played out in reality offers an insight into where and how the government is able to exert leverage. Since these acquisitions, not much has changed on OVL's reserves book, as shown in Figure   4 , although production has been creeping up, roughly at 1.5 MMTPA (0.03 mbd). Despite several attempts, OVL's success has been limited in acquiring other producing assets. 
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Vignette: The Mundra "Ultra Mega" Project
In recent years, there has been much discussion in Indian policy circles of allowing international mining companies to participate in India's coal sector. To date, international majors have been effectively shut out of the Indian market, frustrated by rules that make obtaining coal blocks effectively impossible. The best blocks invariably go to CIL for reasons similar to the reasons for ONGC's success in the early NELP rounds-CIL, as the most competent and powerful of the government agents, has effective control over the allocation process. Moreover, poor port infrastructure has limited the country's ability to import coal. India currently utilizes its import capacity fully yet imports only less than 40 The forthcoming 4,000 MW "Ultra Mega" power project in the Mundra district of Gujarat, recently awarded to the Tata Group, exemplifies many of our themes. It features powerful non-state actors leading foreign energy policy in an environment of state weakness. And it is a project that only exists because of the failure of the state sector to provide secure domestic energy.
The new Mundra coal terminal, an integral part of the project, will allow the plant to import fully its needed 15-20 Million tons of coal a year, represents by far the largest project of its kind in India. (When completed, the terminal will have a throughput of 35 million tons, allowing supplies not just for the plant but also for other users.). 44 This project matters not just because it alone will generate large amounts of power and will nearly double the country's coal imports but also because it is the most prominent of a planned 11 "ultra mega" power projects, most of which are slated to rely on imported coal with private jetties and other import infrastructure. Mundra is a vision of India's coal and power future. The Mundra project illustrates two important shifts in GoI's approach to energy security.
First, the project is rooted in failures to make the domestic coal sector more capable. In effect, this project has created a large foreign profile for India and its companies because the domestic politics of serious coal sector reform are too difficult to handle at the pace needed to sustain rising demand for coal. Second, the government is relying increasingly on private companies-albeit those with strong political connection to the state-to assemble all the practical elements of viable overseas efforts and link them back to commercially viable projects at home. State-owned enterprises, the traditional champions in the Indian economy, play essentially no role.
The Mundra project is anchored in an alliance by Tata Corporation with Bumi Resources, a major Indonesian coal mining company. Tata organized the project, and in order to win the bidding competition it was required to show that it had a guaranteed coal supply--and in order for Tata to obtain this coal supply it had to enter (with Bumi as its agent) the morass of Indonesian energy politics at a time in which Indonesians have become increasingly hostile to coal exports due to the environmental damage and the need for energy resources at home. Furthermore local villagers have become more assertive in demanding additional compensation for allowing mining in their immediate vicinity, bringing Tata, and by extension India, into potential ground-level conflict with rural Indonesians.
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The deal also required Tata to purchase an equity stake in the Indonesian mining operations (US$1.3 Billion for a 30% share) to create a natural hedge against changes in coal prices and 45 "Tata secures Bumi deal with 10mt/yr off-take" McCloskey's Coal Report, vol 157 April 5, 2007 to provide needed assurance to regulators that Tata could reliably deliver coal over the lifetime of the project. 46 Increases in the coal price, for example, would squeeze the power operations since coal fuel is a major cost for operating the power plant but would increase the value of the mining operations. 47 These arrangements, along with the high cost of transportation, nonetheless made sense because the delivered price for coal in Gujaratwhich, on the west coast of India, is geographically far from the main sources of Indian domestic coal-is often three times the price a the Indian mine mouth. The Indian domestic rail and barge network is fragile and unreliable. 48 In one month in late 2007, twenty-three Indian Power plants were short of promised coal supplies.
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Thus Indian power companies find themselves effectively entering the international coal mining market to make up for politically-generated shortcomings in the existing Indian system. The main source of insecurity in Indian coal supply is failure in domestic policy and in the operations of India's state-owned coal enterprise. The main source of security is imports. Tata is conducting foreign energy policy with deals as complex as any envisioned 46 The Tata-Bumi investment came joined with an agreement to supply 10 Million tons annually of coal from Bumi's Indonesian mines to Tata's Mundra Power plant at a price linked to international coal indexes. The Indian government effectively required an equity deal as a condition for approving the power plant. All bidders for the Ultra Mega project were required to have 15 years of secured imported coal supply, something that was not realistically possible, in the judgment of Tata executives without both an equity stake in foreign mining operations. (GGW Interview) Tata's a take-or-pay deal for at least a 12 year term and the Bumi deal will supply half of the 21 MT Tata was going to need not just for the Ultra Mega but for 3000 MW of additional coastal coal projects in Gujarat that will be based entirely on imported coal. by OVL, with financially much better prospects. All of this is animated by the failure of the domestic market to provide reliable supplies for a large coal-fired power project.
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Bumi, meanwhile, is using the proceeds of its equity sale to expand into other areas of mining with the goal of striking other similar deals with other Indian power producers at similarly beneficial rates. 95% of coal from Bumi's mine is destined for exports.
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As an illustration of the power of competition, even CIL is now attempting to expand into foreign coal markets, given the difficulties of operating in their current environment. 52 CIL plans to purchase coking coal mines in Australia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique and thermal coal mines in Indonesia and South Africa. Recently, it has teamed with NTPC, India's largest power generator, and SAIL, the state-run steel producer are, who also are looking to "go out". In November of 2007, CIL joined with them and other major state-owned power and steel companies to create a special purpose vehicle for foreign coal investment with $2.5
Billion in capital.
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II.3 ELECTRIC POWER
With over 146,000 MW of installed generating capacity, India has the World's 4 th largest electricity sector. 54 About half of India's electricity is generated by state-level companies, and 34% is generated by the central government; the private sector share is barely 14%, although most statistics under-state the role of private "captive" supplies such as on-site generators that deliver power when the grid (as usual) is unreliable. 55 India's electricity generation is dominated by coal (65%) and hydropower (20%) although there is a small but growing role for natural gas and renewables as well. Large fractions of the generated power do not make it to customers-mainly due to losses that arise for technical reasons such as poor equipment and maintenance as well as so-called "commercial" losses such as theft and lack of bill collection. As with other sectors of India's energy economy, the actual impact of these reforms has been conditioned heavily by Indian domestic politics. In particular, state governments keep power prices at artificially low levels and some offer free power to politically favored constituencies such as farmers. Poor accounting and corruption in the sector allow wellconnected constituencies to steal power and hide the losses in loose accounts. (Indeed, many of the losses normally attributed to farmers is actually stolen by other constituencies;
"farmer" power is not actually metered but calculated as a residual that includes all commercial losses that can't be assigned to other customer classes.)
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Because of both technical limitations and theft, system losses are very high and in some settings account for roughly half of all power generated, compared with about a 10% loss in the transportation and distribution system of a typical power grid in a well-managed system. 57 The value of total system losses for the SEB's were 1.2% of India's GDP in 2005. 58 Many analysts underscore that the country has a large "deficit" in power-that is an 56 Interview with Navroz Dubash, July 2007 57 Statistics from Central Electiricity Authority. Total losses in 2005 (the latest year for which there is published, comprehensive data, were higher than 40% for eleven SEBs, 30% to 40% in seven SEBs, and 20% to 30% in eight SEBs. In Tamil Nadu and Goa, losses were under 20%. However, even this substantially understates the scope of the systemic problems, as such losses do not include uncollected billing, which brings average losses up to closer to 40-60%. Better-governed states tend to have less electricity losses, but many of India's most populous states have poor grid performance. 58 Krishnaswamy, Venkataraman, et. al. Prospects and Potential opposition. 69 The strong and broad support for the deal among India's elite establishment was anchored in the realization that failure to honor the promise would badly damage India's credibility in the international arena.
Though Singh and the UPA eventually emerged victorious, the central fact of the agreement remains that it has shown that even the highest profile energy and energy security agreements in the sector can be held hostage to domestic politics. While the strength of domestic opposition seemed to catch Congress leadership by surprise, the risks were well understood by many independent commentators. As one of our co-authors had testified before the U.S. Congress concerning the deal, the framers of the agreement needed to "pay attention to how the deal plays locally. It is striking how much hostility the deal has engendered in the Indian press, as Indian nationalists portray this as an erosion of India's sovereign prerogative to sustain a nuclear weapons program." 70 Unfortunately, these warnings went unheeded, needlessly damaging India's international credibility, and almost delivering a large setback to India's energy security.
CONCLUSION
There is a wide gap between the theoretical imperative for a strategic energy policy and the Government of India's (GoI's) ability to put such a policy into practice. There are large and real problems of insecure energy supply, and politicians devote much attention to the need for "energy security." But while India's relative weakness in international energy politics 69 "Indian PM celebrates vote win, Says millions will benefit. Angence France-Presse, July 23, 2008 does present some real strategic problems, the most urgent problems in insecurity arise from the domestic functioning of the energy system-in particular, the supply of coal and the generation and distribution of electricity. Oil, which is the mainstay of energy security debates in most of the world, is also on the radar screen but of lesser consequence than coal and electricity because oil supplies have proved more reliable.
As we have argued, most of India's "energy security" initiatives have little real impact for two reasons. First, policy initiatives are framed in a political environment that is highly fragmented and unstable, with power shared between the central and state governments and with many uneasy political coalitions dominating the landscape. Second, the GoI's administrative capacity in the energy sector is extremely weak.
These domestic factors-relating to energy security priorities, political fragmentation and administrative capacity-usually overwhelm the foreign policy aspects of energy. India's foreign policy apparatus has little leverage over what Indian firms do. It has had fleeting success with a few oil-based projects, such as OVL's investment in Sakhalin-I (which arose partly due to foreign policy backing). But OVL's technological and strategic weaknesses make it a poor player on the world stage. By contrast, actual investment and operations are poised to be much more important around the coal supply networks for the ultra mega power plants-there, the foreign policy apparatus plays very little role and success is rooted in commercially-cogent transactions led by commercially-managed Indian firms rather than state enterprises. Nonetheless, Indian firms are themselves exposed to contentious international issues through this framework, as we have seen with the Tata-Bumi deal in Indonesia.
We have illustrated our arguments using vignettes from several different energy sectors. In general, energy policy initiatives that require significant and effective involvement of the GoI-such as through the Government's role in forging a political coalition, providing backing through foreign policy, or supplying effective regulation-are the least successful.
Specifically, for example, political incoherence in India has severely limited reforms in the coal sector; that incoherence has also brought the US-India nuclear deal to the brink of collapse. The NELP and electricity sector reforms have had only limited success, owing mostly to the weak administrative capacity of the GoI. The capability of the GoI's foreign policy apparatus to benefit India's energy situation is muted either because its relatively miniscule leverage vis-à-vis Chinese counterparts (in the case of ONGC Videsh, for example) or because it is often hostage to domestic political interests (as in the case of the US-India nuclear deal or in the case of the Tala hydro project, which was undertaken not primarily because of India's foreign policy efforts but because the Electricity Act of 2003 spurred investments in the domestic transmission infrastructure.)
These arguments lead to a final observation. A truly strategic energy policy is unlikely in India without a massive, and unlikely, transformation of the role of government in energy issues. The government must become much more capable of regulating and reforming the national energy system before it can successfully integrate strategic energy-related decisions into its foreign policy strategy.
